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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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MEMBRANDOM FOR ACTING DEPTTY UNDER SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL PROCEASE AND

TECRNOLOGY) DEPUTT ASSISTANT SECRETARY (EAST ASIA & PACIFIC AFFAIRS). INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL (INTELLIGENCE, INT'L & INVESTIGATIVE PROCEASE) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (ASS'T VICE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENTIFIC

& TECH INTELLIGENCE) DIRECTOR FOR FAR/MIDDLE EAST/S REMISPRIZE AFFAIRS (DOSD/IPAT) ORGANIZATION JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JS - FAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA DIV) DEPARTMENT OF THE HAVE (O7-52)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ALR FORCE (CVALP) STRIECT: PRC MIG-21 Engine Overheul-Coating Request (6)

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OUSDRY

(U) On 2 March 1981 (15:25-15:31) I received a phone call from Mr. Lennox E. Black, President of Telefiex, Inc. (perant company of Sarmetel, Inc.). Mr. Black stated that the Chinese (PRC) had told him that the Chromalloy American Corporation had retently received approved from the USE to cost three Chinese MIG-II sircreft engines with their special cormic-setallic exide coatings, and that once cuated, the engines were to be returned to the

FEC for Chinese test end evaluation. (U) Mr. Black further indicated that the Chinese would like for his company to liberies cost seven other MG-21 engines using the Sermalloy-1 process.

Sermetel would, like Chromalloy, also return the engines back to China for their teet and evaluation. He asked if the Chinese statement was true; and if so, would his company receive the same treatment? I remarked that I would look into the situation and that all compenies would be treated the same.

(U) LtC B. k. Meiser, Director, Munitions Control Staff of my Office, reviewed all DoD cases for the FRC and elso contacted the Office of Minitions Control (OMC) at State to see if they had either received or approved any such License for the PRC. Neither OUSDRE ner CMC files revealed any such license

application or regultent approval. Mr. Na. Robinson, Director of CMC, did indicate to LtC Meleer, however, that he had heard there might be such an application forthcoming shortly. Under the present guidelines on noted in Reveletter 61 and subsequent interpretations thereof, license applications of this type cannot be approved. Mr. Robinson further stated that he would either

(U) At my request, Mr. Robinson indicated he would not disapprove or RMA such license applications until we had the opportunity to discuss them in detail. He was also acked to immediately inform us and his sweetiers whenever

disapprove or raturn without action (RWA) all such applications.

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the Chinese, Chromelloy or Sermetal/Teleflax do submit applications for this purpess.

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ter The primary retionals for requesting Oic/State to delay immediate advares action on these licenses is because of the petential opportunities they provide the new administration. If approved, they would allow the U.S. to cautionaly move into a moderate but closer defense relationship with the Chinese; and it would provide the type of technical essistance they have repeatedly emphasized they need with respect to their intercepter eigereft. (U) Approved in this instance is obviously a major policy decision, and

set simply an operational or technical one, even though the number of engines involved is small and the objective is simply to coat the engines, not transfer the technology. For your information, U.S. companies have set up similar coating facilities in both Western European and East Asian (e.g., Japan and Halaysia) countries, and could be approached by the Chinese to perform the same service. Lat There are, of course, other potential benefits to the U.S., not the

least of which would be the excellent opportunity to exploit the Chinese engines for technical intelligence purposes. If considered appropriate, arrangements could probably be made for the U.S. to assist the Chinese in a joint toot and evaluation program. This would be extremely helpful to we if proper test controls and conditions were followed and we had access

to all of the test results. ICT An adventage to approving this type of licenes application is the fact that only the result (or product) of U.S. technology would be experted. Heither the production know-how nor a process-line type of capability would be experted. Of itself, it potentially opens up for consideration other U.S. services which might be made aveilable to help the Chinese improve their overall tectical posture. At the same time, however, this approach would have the PRC dependent upon the U.S. for future services, unless of Course, later USG decisions permitted the technology and process equipment

to be exported. Providing only services has other adventages as well. It is, for example, such less dramatic and provocative vis-a-vis the USSE, and is consonent with the step-by-step approach to improving US-PRC relations agreed to during earlier meetings with the Chinese. It would most likely require consultations with our COCON siliss, however, se well as a revision

of existing guidelines. The porential disadvantages of approval are those essociated with any closer defence relationship with the Chinese. In addition, the Chinese could convey the results of their tests and evaluations to the USSR. The out benefits to China of their doing so ere less obvious, however.

(U) This does oppose to be one of the more unique opportunities available to move towards c-closer US-PRC relationship. It would also start things moving again vis-s-wis the PRC. It appears to have very limited risks for our own security, and does have other side benefits. It must be a conscious more own security, and should be taken only after the relative risks

and benefite have been evaluated by OSD, OJCS and the Sarvices. (U) Ther comments and guidance on what action to take regarding the above-

> francis 1. Hilliary Schoolegy

mentioned cased are requested.